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Abstract
Traditional point-to-point message authentication systems have been extensively studied in the
literature. In this paper, we consider authentication systems for group communication. The basic
primitive is a multireceiver authentication system with dynamic senders (DMRA-code). In a
DMRA-code any member of the group can broadcast an authenticated message to the rest of
the group such that every other member of the group can individually verify the authenticity
of the message. We give a 0exible ‘synthesis’ construction for DMRA-codes by combining an
A-code and a key distribution pattern. tDMRA-codes extend this model when there are up to
t senders. We give two constructions, one algebraic and one by ‘synthesis’ of an A-code and
a perfect hash family. We show universality of ‘synthesis’ constructions for unconditional and
computational models of security which means that our results have wider range applications.
Finally, to demonstrate the usefulness of DMRA model, we modify a secure dynamic conference-
key distribution system to construct a secure dynamic conference system that provides secrecy
and authenticity of communication among conferencees. The system is key-e5cient as its key
requirement remains nearly the same as the original conference key distribution system and so
authentication is e7ectively obtained without any extra cost. We discuss possible extensions to
this work. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Authentication; Multireceiver authentication code; Broadcast authentication; Key
distribution pattern; Perfect hash family; Group communication
1. Introduction
Collaborative and multi-user applications, such as teleconferences and electronic
commerce applications, require secure communication among members of a group.
Ensuring integrity and authenticity of information is independent from providing
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conFdentiality and an authenticated messages might be in plaintext form readable by
public.
We consider the following scenario. There is a set of users and a trusted authority
(TA). During the initialization of the system, the TA generates keys for all users and
securely gives the keys to them. Later, any user can broadcast a message whose origin
and content is individually veriFable by every other user. We assume that users are not
all trusted and may collude to construct a fraudulent message, to be attributed to another
user. We assume security is unconditional and does not rely on any computational
assumption.
The obvious method of providing protection in the above system is to use a con-
ventional point-to-point authentication system and give a shared key to each pair of
users. Now to construct an authenticated message, a user will construct a separate au-
thenticator for every other user, concatenate them together and append the result to
the message. This will allow a receiver to individually verify the authenticity of the
message by verifying the authenticator constructed using his shared key. An immediate
drawback of such a system is that it requires a very large key storage, and produces a
very long tag for a message, resulting in high communication cost.
Multireceiver authentication systems (MRA-codes) [11] are the Frst attempt to model
and construct systems that provide authentication in group communication. However,
in this model the sender is Fxed. In [25] this limitation is removed and any group
member is allowed to be the sender. The extended model is called MRA-code with
dynamic sender, or DMRA-codes for short. DMRA-codes capture the essential proper-
ties of authentication systems for group communication but the model is restricted and
allows only one message to be sent. However, in many applications such as dynamic
conference key distributions, group members interact with each other and more than
one sender exists. Moreover, the only known non-trivial construction of MRA-codes
[25, 27] is very in0exible and for large size groups, or large size sources, results in
very ine5cient constructions with many key bits and long authenticators. In summary,
although DMRA-codes do provide a promising model for authentication in group com-
munication, for practical applications more general, 0exible and e5cient constructions
are required.
Our goal is to have solutions that are e5cient both in terms of storage and commu-
nication cost. To achieve this goal we will have two assumptions.
• The largest size of collusion set is w.
• There are at most t transmitters (senders).
The Frst assumption e7ectively bounds the power of attackers, and the second one
is a more complex version of the degree of spooFng in a conventional authentication
system. This is because in a spooFng of order t attack in an A-code, the enemy has
access to t previous messages sent by the same transmitter and wants to construct a
fraudulent codeword. In group authentication systems we allow senders of messages to
be di7erent and so a new type of attack, that is changing the originator of a message,
must be taken into account. The attack uses the fact that in many applications such as a
voting system with many participants and only a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, the same message
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will be sent by more than one sender. The attack suggests that in a DMRA-code with
multiple dynamic senders, an authenticated message must carry some information about
its origin.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1. We extend the model of DMRA-codes proposed in [25], to allow more than one
sender and give a formal deFnition for such systems.
2. We propose a general ‘synthesis’ construction for DMRA-codes by combining
a key distribution pattern (KDP) [22] and an A-code, such that the protection
of the resulting system can be determined by the protection of the A-code and
parameters of the KDP. The construction is especially attractive as it reduces the
construction of DMRA-codes to the construction of suitable KDPs and A-codes and
allows direct application of the known results in these areas to the construction of
DMRA-codes.
3. We consider a DMRA-code with t senders, tDMRA-code for short, and give two
new constructions for such codes. The Frst construction is algebraic and uses poly-
nomials in two variables using an approach similar to the optimal construction for
single-sender scheme. The second construction is a ‘synthesis’ construction which
is combinatorial in nature and combines a perfect hash family and an arbitrary A-
code to obtain a tDMRA-code. The construction has the generality and 0exibility
that we noted earlier in the ‘synthesis’ construction of DMRA-codes from KDP and
A-codes.
4. To show the usefulness of our results, we apply DMRA-codes to the construction
of secure dynamic conference system. Security means that messages from a con-
ference is only readable, and veriable for its authenticity, by other conference
members. We note that a secure conference key distribution protocol can be used to
provide conFdentiality for conference members but the origin of messages cannot
be determined and the system does not provide any accountability. Our construction
uses an optimal dynamic conference key distribution system proposed in [8], and
for large group sizes, as long as the conference size is relatively small, e7ectively
adds authentication without any extra cost (extra key bits).
5. Although our main analysis is for Cartesian A-codes with unconditional security
but our main constructions are universal. That is they can also be used for A-
codes with secrecy and Message Authentication Codes (MAC), resulting in systems
in which protection is determined by the security property of the underlying
authentication system (A-code with or without secrecy, or MAC) and parameters
of the combinatorial structure, a KDP or a perfect hash family. This means that a
primitive authentication system can be used for e5cient authentication in large
groups.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and give
the deFnitions. In Section 3 we brie0y review previous results for DMRA-codes and
then propose an e5cient construction using key distribution patterns and conven-
tional A-codes. In Section 4 we consider systems with multiple senders and present
two constructions. In Section 5 we propose a secure dynamic conference system and
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conclude the paper in Section 6 by discussing computationally secure systems and
proposing possible extensions of this work. Results in this paper were in part pre-
sented at Asiacrypt’99.
2. The model
2.1. Conventional A-codes
In a conventional authentication system (A-system) [28] a sender wants to send a
message over a public channel to a receiver in the presence of an active spoofer who
can insert a message into the channel (impersonation attack), or observe a transmitted
message and then replace it with a fraudulent one (substitution attack). To provide
protection against a spoofer’s attack, the sender and receiver use an authentication code
(A-code), which is a collection of transformations from the set of source states, S, to
the set of codewords, M . In A-codes without secrecy, also called Cartesian A-codes, a
codeword determines a unique source state. In a systematic Cartesian A-code a code-
word for a message s is of the form (s; a), where a∈A is called authenticator or tag.
Sender and receiver share a key e∈E which determines the authentication function,
e() : S→A, used to generate the authenticator a= e(s), for a source state s. An au-
thenticated message generated by the sender is equal to (s; e(s))∈M . The receiver will
detect a fraudulent message (s; t) if t = e(s). We will write an A-code as C =(S;M; E)
(or C =(S; A; E) for a systematic Cartesian A-code), and denote the probability of
success in impersonation and substitution attacks by PI and PS, respectively. We also
denote the overall deception probability of an A-code by PD = max{PI; PS}.
2.2. DMRA-codes
A (w; n) MRA-code [11] is an extension of the classical A-systems where a xed
sender can authenticate a single message for a group of n receivers such that collusions
of up to w receivers cannot construct a fraudulent codeword which is accepted by
another receiver. Bounds and construction for MRA-codes are given in [16, 18, 25].
An extension of the MRA-code model is when the sender is not Fxed and can be
any member of the group. The system is called an MRA-code with dynamic sender.
Allowing the sender to be dynamic introduces a new type of attack in which the intruder
changes the origin information of a message sent by Pj and resends it with the aim
of attributing it to Pi. This attack could have a high success chance if Pi and Pj share
key information. This means that schemes that establish a common key among two
or more users, including the scheme described in Section 1, the construction based on
symmetric polynomial [25] or KDP and its more general form (i; j)-cover-free family
[31] cannot be used for key distribution.
To protect against the above attack the origin of a broadcasted message must be
included in the message and authentication will be with respect to a particular orig-
inator. This can be done by (1) attaching identity information to the message and
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then authenticating the resulting message, or (2) appending the origin information to
the authenticated message. The Frst approach will e7ectively increase the size of the
message space to be authenticated and in the case of a small source and a large group
of users such as the voting system above, is not acceptable. We will show that this
information is theoretically redundant and can be removed in an optimal system. In
this paper we assume the second approach.
An attacker succeeds by either changing the origin, or the message, and hence
the system must provide both origin (entity) authentication and message authenti-
cation. To verify the authenticity of a received message the receiver must Frst
assume an originator for the message and then verify the message with respect to that
originator.
In the model of MRA-code with dynamic senders, there are n users P= {P1; : : : ; Pn},
who want to communicate over a broadcast channel. The channel is subject to spooFng
attack: that is a codeword can be inserted into the channel or, a transmitted codeword
can be substituted with a fraudulent one. An attack is directed towards a channel,
consisting of a pair of users {Pi; Pj}, Pi being the sender and Pj being the receiver. A
spoofer might be an outsider, or a coalition of w insiders. The aim of the spoofer(s)
is to construct a codeword that Pj accepts as authentic and being sent from Pi.
A TA generates secret keys for users and securely distributes them. The TA is only
active during key distribution phase. The system consists of three phases.
1. Key Distribution: The TA randomly chooses a key e∈E and uses a key distribution
algorithm
 : E → E1 × · · · × En; (e) = (e1; : : : ; en)
to generate a key ei and secretly sends ei to Pi, for all 16i6n.
2. Broadcast: A user Pi constructs an authenticated message and broadcasts it. For
this, Pi uses an authentication algorithm,
Ai : S × Ei → Mi; Ai(s; ei) = mi;
where Ei and Mi are the set of keys and authenticated codewords, respectively, for
Pi. The codeword sent by Pi for a source state s∈ S is (i;Ai(s; ei))= (i; mi).
3. Verication: A user Pj, where 16j6n, uses a veriFcation algorithm Vji to accept
or reject the received codeword. That is, user Pj has a set of veriFcation algorithms
{Vji; 16i6n; j = i} with
Vji : Mi × Ej → {0; 1};
such that Vji(mi; ej)= 1 if Pj accepts mi as an authenticated codeword received from
Pi, and Vji(mi; ej)= 0, otherwise.
We will denote the code described above as C =(S; E; {Ai; Ei}16i6n) and call C a
MRA-code with dynamic sender(s) (or DMRA-code for short). We assume that after
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the key-distribution phase, there are at most t users who will broadcast authenticated
messages, where all messages come from a set S of source states. For simplicity, we
also assume that each sender may only broadcast a single message. We will adopt
the Kerckho7’s principle that details of the system, except the actual keys, are public.
To assess security, we deFne the probability of success in various attacks. Let w
denote the largest size of the collusion set, and B and A be two subsets of {1; : : : ; n}
with |B|= 6t and |A|= 6w. Without loss of generality, let B= {k1; : : : ; k} and
A= {‘1; : : : ; ‘}, and denote PB= {Pk1 ; : : : ; Pk} and PA= {P‘1 ; : : : ; P‘}. Assume that
after seeing  authenticated messages (sk1 ; ak1 ); : : : ; (sk ; ak) broadcasted by Pk1 ; : : : ; Pk ,
respectively, (sk1 ; : : : ; sk are not necessarily distinct), PA wants to generate a message
(si; ai) such that it will be accepted by Pj as an authenticated message broadcasted by
Pi. We further assume that i; j∈A. 2
Let P[m; PA; PB; Pi; Pj] denote the probability of success for malicious users in PA in
using a message m as broadcasted by Pi, after the broadcasted messages from PB are
seen. We assume malicious users use their optimal strategy that maximizes their
chance of success. They can choose the message m and the channel, that is Pi, Pj, to
achieve this goal.
It is easy to see that if A⊂A′, then P[m; PA; PB; Pi; Pj]6P[m; PA′ ; PB; Pi; Pj]. Thus,
without loss of generality, we assume that |A|=w. For each 06k6t, we deFne
PDk = maxm; A; B; i; j
P[m; PA; PB; Pi; Pj];
where the maximum is taken over all possible m; A; B; i; j such that |A|=w, |B|= k and
i; j =∈A. We then deFne the overall probability of deception, denoted by PD, as
PD = max{PD0 ; PD1 ; : : : ; PDt}:
Denition 2.1. An MRA-code with t dynamic senders C =(S; E; {Ai; Ei}16i6n) is called
a (w; n) tDMRA-code if PD¡1.
3. DMRA-codes with a single sender
We start with the simplest (w; n) tDMRA-code in which t=1 and simply call it
a (w; n) DMRA-code. This is exactly the same model as MRA-code with dynamic
sender introduced in [25]. In Section 3.1 we review combinatorial lower bounds on the
key sizes of users and the length of the authenticators, and the optimal construction
2 There are other possible attacks for the case i∈A or j∈A. For example, a user claims to have received
a message from another user when it was never sent, or after a message is broadcasted, the sender denies
having sent it. To avoid these attacks in conventional A-codes, a new participant, called an arbiter, is
introduced who in the case of a dispute arbitrates between the transmitter and the receiver. The resulting
A-code is called A-code with arbiter, or A2-code. A similar approach can be considered for DMRA-codes
with dynamic senders.
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that meets these bounds given in [27]. In Section 3.2 we will give a new ‘synthesis’
construction from key distribution patterns.
3.1. Bounds and an optimal construction
E5ciency of a (w; n) DMRA-code C =(S; E; {Mi; Ei}16i6n), can be measured in
terms of the size of users’ key spaces, |Ei|’s, and the length of the authenticated
messages, |Mi|’s. We do not really need to consider the key size of the TA, |E|, as
after the key distribution phase the TA does not need to save the keys. The following
lower bounds can be used to determine the best performance of a DMRA-code.
Theorem 3.1 (Safari-Naini & Wang [27]). In a (w; n) DMRA-code C =(S; E; {Mi;
Ei}16i6n) with PD61=q and uniform probability distribution on the source S; we
have
(i) |Ei|¿q2(w+1); for each i∈{1; 2; : : : ; n};
(ii) |Mi|¿qw+1|S|; for each i∈{1; 2; : : : ; n}:
The bounds are tight [27] and a system that meets the bounds can be obtained by
a slight modiFcation of the scheme proposed in [25]. This scheme uses symmetric
polynomials in two variables over GF(q) (similar to Blom’s key distribution scheme
[7]) and works as follows. Let S be the set of source states and q¿max{|S|; n} be a
prime power. First, the TA randomly chooses two symmetric polynomials F(x; y) and
G(x; y) with coe5cients in GF(q) and of degree at most w. Then he gives (fi(x); gi(x)),
where fi(x)=F(x; i) and gi(x)=G(x; i), to user Pi. This constitutes the secret key of
Pi, 16i6n. When a user Pi wants to authenticate a source state s∈ S, he computes the
polynomial Ai(x)=fi(x) + sgi(x) and broadcasts (s; Ai(x)) together with his identity i
to all other users. User Pj will accept (s; Ai(x)) as authentic and being sent from Pi
if and only if Ai(j)=fj(i) + sgj(i). It is proved [27] that this construction results in
a (w; n) DMRA-code with PD =1=q, |Ei|= q2w and |Mi|= qw|S|, 16i6n, and so the
bounds in Theorem 3.1 are met.
The above construction, although optimal, is very restrictive as q determines not
only the deception probability but also the size of the key space and the length of the
tag. More speciFcally, for PD =1=q the key size and the authenticator length for users
are both of order O(log q). This means that for large size sources, and=or large size
groups, the construction requires high values for q and results in unnecessarily low
value for PD at the expense of large key spaces, and long authenticators for users.
3.2. A general construction
In the following we show a general construction for (w; n) DMRA-codes by com-
bining a key-distribution pattern and an A-code such that the security of the resulting
system is determined by the security of the underlying A-code and the parameters of
the key-distribution pattern. The importance of this construction is that it provides
a much higher degree of 0exibility in the design of DMRA-codes and results in
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constructions that are of practical interest. The construction can be seen as an ex-
tension of a construction in [25], replacing the cover-free family with a KDP.
Key distribution patterns (KDP) [22] are explicitly or implicitly used by numerous
authors to construct key-distribution systems ([12, 17, 20, 23, 24, 30, 31]).
Let X = {x1; x2; : : : ; xv} be a set and let B= {B1; B2; : : : ; Bn} be a family of subsets of
X . The set system (X;B) is called an (n; v; w) key-distribution pattern (or KDP(n; v; w)
for short) if∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
Bi ∩ Bj
)/( w⋃
s=1
B‘s
)∣∣∣∣∣∣¿1
for any w + 2 subset {i; j; ‘1; : : : ; ‘w} of {1; 2; : : : ; n}.
Assume there are n users P1; : : : ; Pn. Let (X;B) be a KDP(n; v; w) and (S; A0; E0)
denote a Cartesian A-code with PD61=q. Both (X;B) and (S; A0; E0) are public.
Associate Bi to Pi, 16i6n.
1. Key distribution: For each 16j6v; the TA randomly chooses an authentication
key ej ∈E0 and gives ej to user Pi if xj ∈Bi. Thus, user Pi receives a |Bi|-tuple,
(ei1 ; : : : ; ei|Bi|)∈E
|Bi|
0 , as his=her secret authentication key.
2. Broadcast: When Pi wants to construct an authenticated message for a source
state s∈ S, he computes |Bi| partial authenticators ei‘(s), 16‘6|Bi|, and broad-
casts (i; s; ei1 (s); : : : ; ei|Bi|(s)).
3. Verication: A user can verify the authenticity and origin of a broadcasted message,
(i; s; ai1 ; : : : ; ai|Bi|), in the following way: Pj uses the origin information, i, to deter-
mine the set Eij = {ei‘}16‘6|Bi| ∩{ejk}16k6|Bj| and accepts the message as authentic
and sent from Pi if aiu = eiu(s) for all eiu ∈Eij.
Theorem 3.2. Consider an A-code (S; A0; E0) with deception probability PD61=q.
Then the above construction results in a (w; n) DMRA-code C =(S; E; {Ai; Ei}16i6n)
with PD61=q. The code has the following parameters:
|E| = |E0|v; |Ei| = |E0||Bi| and |Ai| = |A0||Bi|:
Proof. Assume there are w colluding users, P1; : : : ; Pw, who see a broadcasted message
and want to construct a fraudulent one to be accepted by Pj and attributed to Pi. Since
|(Bi ∩Bj) \ (
⋃w
t=1 Bt)|¿1, it follows that there exists at least one key eij ∈E0 that is
known to Pi and Pj, but is unknown to P1; : : : ; Pw. Because of the properties of the
underlying A-code, the success probability of colluders in constructing a fraudulent
message is not better than the success chance of an outside enemy in the A-code and
is bounded by 1=q.
The construction also works for general A-codes in which case the broadcasted
codeword by Pi is (mi1 · · ·mi|Bi|) where mij = eij (s). However, the main advantage of
the construction is its 0exibility in the choice of parameters. The following example
illustrates the ideas and shows the e7ectiveness of the above construction.
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Example 3.1. Assume a network of 5000 users. Let the biggest size of colluding sub-
sets be 5 and assume messages are of length 250 bits (i.e. |S|=2250).
1. Using the optimal construction based on polynomials we have:
– The key storage for the TA and each user is 42× 250 and 12× 250 bits, respec-
tively;
– The length of the authenticator is 6× 250 bits;
– PD6 12250 (very low).
2. Using the construction given in this section:
Assume PD6 1219 . This is acceptable for most practical purposes. We use an A-code
that provides enough protection, and a KDP with n=5000 and w=5. For example
we employ the A-code constructed from universal hashing families in [4] with the
following parameters: |S|=2250 , authenticator length 20 bits, and the key length 125
bits. Using a probabilistic method developed in [12], we will obtain a KDP(n; v; w)
with n=5000; v=3928, w=5 having an average block size, |Bi|=1123, 16i6n. We
obtain a (5; 5000)-DMRA code with the following parameters.
– The key storages for the TA and each user are 591 and 140 Kbits, respectively;
– The length of the authenticator is 2:5 Kbits;
– PD6 1219 .
Compared to the optimal construction the key storage and the communication cost
are dramatically reduced while the deception probability has increased from 1
2250
to 1219
which is considered adequate security level for practical applications.
This construction is especially useful in practical applications where secure key stor-
age and communication bandwidth are scarce and valuable resources.
To obtain key e5cient constructions from Theorem 3.2 we require a KDP(n; v; w)
with small v. The trivial key distribution KDP(n; v; w) with w6n−2 has B equal to the
collection of pairs of X , and so n= v(v−1)=2 and |Bi|= v−1 for all 16i6n. A ‘good’
KDP(n; v; w), is one that for given v and w, n and |Bi| are as small as possible for
16i6n. The constructions in [22, 17] both require v=O(n) which is much better than
the trivial construction with v=O(n2). Dyer et al. [12] gave a probabilistic construction
with v=O(log n), but explicit constructions having v=O(log n) are believed to be hard.
From [31] we know explicit constructions where v is a polynomial function of log n
exist.
It is worth noting that the construction based on KDPs can only result in ‘good’
DMRA-codes (small v) if w is small compared to n. This is because of the rela-
tionship between KDPs and cover-free families and the known bounds on the latter.
More speciFcally, (X;F), where X is a point set and F is a family of subsets of X
with |X |= v and |F|= n, is called an (n; v; w)-cover-free family if Fk0 ⊂Fk1 ∪ · · · ∪Fkw
holds for all Fk0 ; Fk1 ; : : : ; Fkw ∈F, where Fi =Fj if i = j. A KDP(n; v; w) (X;B) gives
an (n − 1; |Bi|; w)-cover-free family by considering Bi as the point set and {Bi ∩Bj;
j=1; 2; : : : ; n and j = i} as F. The proof of this claim is straightforward and is omitted.
ErdPos et al in [14] (Proposition 3:4) showed that in any (n; v; w)-cover-free family with
n¿v, we have (w+22 )¡n: It follows that if (w+2)(w+1)=2¿n− 1, then |Bi|¿n− 1.
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This means that the size of the block in the original KDP must be more than the trivial
scheme and so is not possible.
4. DMRA-codes with multiple senders
In this section we consider tDMRA-codes, with t¿2. In designing a (w; n) tDMRA-
code with t¿2, it is important to note that if the protection for a channel between two
participants Pi and Pj is provided by a symmetric key system, then a message sent by
Pi can be later resent and attributed to Pj. In this case Pi will accept the message as
authentic from Pj and the success chance of the intruder is 1. To avoid this directional
attack, Pi and Pj must have di7erent keys.
In the following we Frst look at two simple approaches to the construction of a
tDMRA-code and then give two more e5cient constructions and assess their security.
Trivial Construction 1. An obvious method of constructing a tDMRA-code is to use t
copies of a DMRA-code with t independent keys. That is, in the key generation phase
the TA chooses t independent keys, e1; e2; : : : ; et , for a DMRA-code with a single sender
and gives user Pi the t tuple, (e1i ; e
2
i ; : : : ; e
t
i). Pi will use key e
‘
i to authenticate (generate
or verify) the ‘th message. In this case the size of the key for each participant is t
times that of a DMRA-code, which for e5cient DMRA-codes and small t could be
reasonably low. The length of the tag for each message is the same as the original
DMRA-code. However the system requires each user to carefully keep track of all the
communicated messages and their corresponding keys.
Trivial Construction 2. A second immediate solution is to use a (w; n−1) MRA-code.
In this case each user receives the key information for sending one message and
verifying n−1 messages. The result is a (w; t) tDMRA-code with t= n. The length
of the tag in this case is the same as the MRA-code but the key storage is at least a
linear function of n and so will be prohibitive for large groups.
4.1. A polynomial construction for tDMRA-codes
The Frst non-trivial construction uses polynomials (non-symmetric) in two variables,
and can be considered as an extension of the optimal DMRA-code in Section 3.1.
Let S =GF(q) be the set of source states. We construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code as
follows.
1. Key distribution: the TA randomly chooses two matrices A;B∈(GF(q))(w+1)×(w+t+1),
and constructs two polynomials, F(x; y) and G(x; y),
F(x; y) = (1; x; : : : ; xw)A(1; y; : : : ; yw+t)T;
G(x; y) = (1; x; : : : ; xw)B(1; y; : : : ; yw+t)T:
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Then he chooses n distinct numbers ai ∈GF(q) and another n distinct numbers
bi ∈GF(q) and announces (ai; bi) as Pi’s identity information. For each i; 16i6n,
the TA privately sends two pairs of polynomials (F(x; ai); G(x; ai)) and (F(bi; y);
G(bi; y)) to Pi. This constitutes Pi’s secret information.
2. Broadcast: If Pi wants to authenticate a message si ∈GF(q), Pi calculates the poly-
nomial Ui(x)=F(x; ai) + siG(x; ai) and broadcasts (i; si; Ui(x)).
3. Verication: Pj can verify the authenticity of (i; si; Ui(x)) by calculating the poly-
nomial Vj(y)=F(bj; y) + siG(bj; y) and accepting (i; si; Ui(x)) as authentic and
being sent from Pi if Vj(ai)=Ui(bj).
Theorem 4.1. The above construction results in a (w; n) tDMRA-code C =(S; E;
{Ai; Ei}16i6n); in which the probability of success for a collusion of up to w users
in performing impersonation or substitution attack on any other pair of users is at
most 1=q. The construction has the following parameters:
|E| = q2(w+1)(t+w+1); |Ei| = q4w+2t+4 and |Ai| = qw+1; 16i6n:
Proof. Assume that {P1; : : : ; Pw} is the colluder set. We need to consider the following
types of attacks: (1) Without seeing any communication, the colluders construct a
fraudulent message (i; si; Ai(x)) such that Pj would accept it as authentic and sent
from Pi. (2) After seeing t broadcasted messages, (i‘; si‘ ; Ui‘(x)), ‘=1; : : : ; t, from
users Pi1 ; : : : ; Pit , the colluders {P1; : : : ; Pw} will have one of the following substitution
attacks. (2a) For some i‘, say i1, the colluders generate a message (i1; s′i1 ; U
′
i1 (x)), where
s′i1 = si1 such that Pj, for some j∈{1; : : : ; n}\{1; : : : ; w}, accepts it as authentic and sent
from Pi′ . (2b) The colluders construct a message (i′; s; Ui′(x)), where i′ =∈{i1; : : : ; it}
and s may or may not be in {si1 ; : : : ; sit}, such that Pj, j∈{1; : : : ; n}\{1; : : : ; w}, accepts
it as authentic and sent from Pi′ . We only give a proof sketch for (2b) and note that
the other two cases can be proved in a similar way. In (2b), the colluders construct a
fraudulent message (s; ai′ ; Ai′(x)) aimed at Pj. They succeed if they can correctly guess
F(bj; ai′) + sG(bj; ai). Now for any given s , let s′ ∈GF(q) and 1 + ss′ =0. Consider
the two polynomials
Fr(x; y) = F(x; y) + r(x − b1) · · · (x − bw)(y − a1)
· · · (y − aw)(y − ai1 ) · · · (y − ait );
Gr(x; y) =G(x; y) + rs′(x − b1) · · · (x − bw)(y − a1)
· · · (y − aw)(y − ai1 ) · · · (y − ait ):
It is easy to verify that for all i, 16i6w, we have
Fr(x; ai) = F(x; ai); Gr(x; ai) = G(x; ai);
Fr(bi; y) = F(bi; y); Gr(bi; y) = G(bi; y)
and for any si‘ ∈GF(q), F(x; ai‘) + si‘G(x; ai‘)=Fr(x; ai‘) + si‘Gr(x; ai‘).
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This means that the colluders had the same information from their secret and the
observed messages, if the TA had chosen Fr(x; y) and Gr(x; y) instead of F(x; y) and
G(x; y). Now it can be veriFed that F(bj; ai′) + sG(bj; ai′)=Fr(bj; ai′) + sGr(bj; ai′)
if and only if r=0. Since r is an arbitrary element of GF(q), and di7erent r give
di7erent Fr(bj; ai′) + sGr(bj; ai′), this implies that the success probability is 1=q.
Comparing this construction with the trivial construction 2, shows a marked
improvement in e5ciency. In particular, if n independent copies of the optimal
MRA-codes based on the polynomial scheme [11] is used, we will have a (w; n) t
DMRA-code C =(S; E; {Mi; Ei}16i6n) with parameters |E|= q(((w+1)w)=2+n), |Ei|=
q2(n−1+w) and |Ai|= qw+1. This means that the key lengths for the TA and users are
O(n log q). Thus, when n is much larger than t; the key storage of above construction
is signiFcantly reduced from the trivial solution.
4.2. A general construction from perfect hash families
In the following we give a general construction for tDMRA-codes by combining an
A-code and a perfect hash family.
4.2.1. Perfect hash families
Perfect hash families (PHF) originally arose as part of compiler design – see [21]
for a summary of the early results in this area. They have applications in numerous
areas of computer science such as operating systems, language translation systems, and
information retrieval systems – see [10] for a survey of recent results. PHF have also
been used in cryptographic applications such as broadcast encryption systems [15],
secret sharing schemes [6], and threshold cryptography [5].
A (n; m; w)-perfect hash family is a set of functions F such that for each f∈F,
f : {1; : : : ; n} → {1; : : : ; m}
and for any X ⊆{1; : : : ; n} such that |X |=w, there exists at least a function fX ∈F
such that fX is an injection on X , i.e. the restriction of fX to X is one-to-one. For a
subset X , if the restriction of a function f to X is one-to-one, then we call f perfect
on X . We will use the notation PHF(N ; n; m; w) for a (n; m; w) perfect hash family
with |F|=N .
Let C0 = (S; E0; A0) be a Cartesian A-code with deception probability PD61, and
assume F= {f1; : : : ; fN} be a PHF(N ; n; n0; w+ t+2) from {1; : : : ; n} to {1; : : : ; n0}.
We construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code C =(S; E; {Aj; Ej}16j6n) as follows.
1. Key distribution: The TA randomly chooses N matrices of size n0× n0,
G1 = (g1u;v)16u6n0 ;16v6n0 ; : : : ; G
N = (gNu;v)16u6n0 ;16v6n0
with entries g‘u;v ∈E0, for all 16‘6N and 16u; v6n0. For each i, 16i6n, the TA
generates the key ei for Pi as a collection of N matrices each with a single non-zero
R. Safavi-Naini, H. Wang / Theoretical Computer Science 269 (2001) 1–21 13
row and a single non-zero column given by,
ei =




g11;f1(i)
...
g1f1(i);1 · · · g1f1(i);f1(i) · · · g1f1(i); n0
...
g1n0 ;f1(i)


;
: : : ;


gN1;fN (i)
...
gNfN (i);1 · · · gNfN (i);fN (i) · · · gNfN (i); n0
...
gNn0 ;fN (i)




and securely sends ei to Pi. That is, the secret key of Pi consists of the f‘(i)th column
and the f‘(i)th row of matrix G‘, for all 16‘6N .
2. Broadcast: If Pi wants to authenticate a message si ∈ S, Pi generates his authenticator
ai for si by
ai =




g11;f1(i)(si)
...
g1n0 ;f1(i)(si)

 ; : : : ;


gN1;fN (i)(si)
...
gNn0 ;fN (i)(si)




and broadcasts (i; si; ai) to all other members. That is, Pi uses his column keys to
generate the authenticator.
3. Verication: Pj uses his row key
([g1f1(j);1; : : : ; g
1
f1(j); n0 ]; : : : ; [g
N
fN (j);1; : : : ; g
N
fN (j); n0 ])
to verify the authenticity of the broadcasted message (i; si; ai) in the following way.
For each ‘, 16‘6N , the f‘(j)th row and the f‘(i)th column of matrix G‘ have the
common entry g‘f‘(j);f‘(i). This is used by Pj to verify if g
‘
f‘(j);f‘(i)(si) is the correct
component of ai.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose there exists a Cartesian A-code C0 = (S; E0; A0) with deception
probability PD61, and a PHF(N ; n; n0; t+w+2). Then the above construction results
in a (w; n) tDMRA-code C =(S; E; {Aj; Ej}16j6n) with deception probability P∗D61.
Various parameters of the tDMRA-code C satisfy
|E| = |E0|Nn20 ; |Ej| = |E0|(2n0−1)N and |Aj| = |A0|n0N ; 16j6n
Proof. Without loss of the generality, we assume that w colluders P1; : : : ; Pw, after
observing t broadcasted messages from t users, Pw+1; : : : ; Pt+w, want to perform an
attack on a pair of users Pi and Pj. That is, the colluders want to generate a message
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(i; si; ai) such that Pj will accept it as an authenticated message from Pi. There are four
cases to be considered. Case 1: Pi; Pj ∈ {Pw+1; : : : ; Pw+t}; Case 2: Pi ∈{Pw+1; : : : ; Pw+t},
but Pj =∈{Pw+1; : : : ; Pw+t}; Case 3: Pi =∈{Pw+1; : : : ; Pw+t}, but Pj ∈{Pw+1; : : : ; Pw+t}; Case
4: Pi; Pj ∈{Pw+1; : : : ; Pw+t}. Let L= {1; : : : ; w+ t; i; j}⊆{1; : : : ; n}. Then |L|=w+ t +2.
There exists a f‘ ∈F such that f‘ is one-to-one on L. Consider the ‘th component keys
of P1; : : : ; Pt ; Pt+1; : : : ; Pw+t ; Pi; Pj, obtained from matrix G‘. Clearly, P1; : : : ; Pw, pooling
their (row and column) keys, have no information about g‘f‘(j);f‘(i), so the probability
that P1; : : : ; Pw can correctly generate the partial authenticator g‘f‘(j);f‘(i)(si), denoted by
P[i; j], satisFes
P[i; j] =


PI case 1;
PS case 2;
PI case 3;
PS case 4;
where P I and PS denote the deception probability of impersonation and substitution
attacks in the underlying A-code C =(S; E0; A0), respectively.
Remarks
1. In the above construction, we can slightly improve the key length of the users and
the length of the authenticator. Observe that for each 16i6n, Pi has the partial
keys g‘f‘(i);f‘(i), which is used to generate ‘partial’ authenticator that can be veriFed
by Pj, or to verify the authenticity of ‘partial’ authenticator sent from Pj, when and
only when f‘(i)=f‘(j). However, if f‘(i)=f‘(j), then Pi and Pj will have the
same ‘th component row and column keys derived from the matrix G‘. So Pi can
use his ‘th component column key to verify the ‘th component of the authenticator
sent by Pj. A similar argument applies to Pj for verifying the authenticity of a mes-
sage received from Pi. Thus we can remove the ‘partial’ key g1f1(i);f1(i); : : : ; g
N
fN (i);fN (i)
without reducing the security of the scheme, except that the veriFcation of the broad-
casted messages will use some column keys. In this case, we can save N log |E0|
bits for each user’s key and N log |A0| bits for each broadcast message.
2. The construction also results in a (w′; n) t′DMRA-code if w′ + t′=w + t. In other
words, there is a trade-o7 between the number of senders and the number of mali-
cious users the system can tolerate.
3. For a given set of parameters, w; t and n, and a given A-code the e5ciency of
the scheme is completely determined by N , the size of perfect hash family F. Let
N (n; m; w) denote the minimum value of N for which a PHF(N ; n; m; w) exists. Thus
we will be interested in perfect hash families with small N (n; m; w) for given n; m
and w. In particular, we are interested in the behavior of N (n; m; w) as a function of
n, when m and w are Fxed. It is proved in [21] that for Fxed m and w, N (n; m; w) is
Q(log n), however, the proof is non-constructive and PHF that achieve this asymp-
totic bound are believed to be di5cult to construct. (f(n)=Q(log n) means that
there exist constants c1, c2 and n0 such that for n¿n0, c1 log n6f(n)6c2 log n.)
In [1, 9] some constructions with reasonable asymptotic performance are given. For
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example, for Fxed m and w, N is a polynomial function of log n. Various other
bounds on N (n; m; w) can be found in [21, 1, 10, 5].
The basic idea behind the above construction is to use N copies of a (w; n0) tDMRA-
code with small n0, to construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code with large n, using a PHF with
suitable parameters. In the above construction the (w; n0) tDMRA-code is obtained
through the trivial construction 2, that is, using n0 copies of an MRA-code. This MRA-
code is obtained from the ‘synthesis’ of an A-code and a trivial cover-free family [25].
In general, one can use any other (w; n0) tDMRA-code in conjunction with the PHF
to obtain a tDMRA-code for larger number of users. Assume that there is a (w; n0)
tDMRA-code C =(S; E; {Ai; Ei}16i6n0 ), and there exists a PHF(N ; n; n0; t+w+2), F.
We construct a (w; n) tDMRA-code C∗=(S; E∗; {A∗i ; E∗i }16i6n) as follows.
1. Key distribution: Consider the perfect hash family F= {f1; : : : ; fN}. The TA ran-
domly and independently chooses N keys e1; : : : ; eN ∈E and calculates n0 keys
et1; : : : ; e
t
n0 , for users. To each user Pi, 16i6n, in the ‘resulting’ code C
∗, the
TA gives the key
e∗i = (e
1
f1(i); e
2
f2(i); : : : ; e
N
fN (i)) ∈ E∗i ;
2. Broadcast: If Pi wants to authenticate a source state si ∈ S, he calculates,
a∗i = (e
1
f1(i)(si); e
2
f2(i)(si); : : : ; e
N
fN (i)(si))
and broadcasts (i; si; a∗i ).
3. Verication: User Pj can verify the authenticity of (i; si; a∗i ) because each subkey
eufu(j), 16u6N of Pj, is the key for the underlying (w; n0) tDMRA-code C and
allows him to verify the authenticity of a∗i , because each component of a∗i is one
of the authenticators of the (w; n0) tDMRA-code with respect to the column keys
e1; : : : ; eN ∈E.
Using an argument identical to Theorem 4.2, the following result can be proved.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose there exists a Cartesian (w; n0) tDMRA-code C =(S; E; {Ai;
Ei}16i6n0 ) with deception probability PD61, and a PHF(N ; n; n0; t+w+2). Then there
exists a (w; n) tDMRA-code C∗=(S; E∗; {A∗j ; E∗j }16j6n) with deception probability
P∗D61. Various parameters of C∗ are
|E∗| = |E|N ; |E∗j |6 max16i6n0{|Ei|
N} and |A∗j |6 max16i6n0{|Ai|
N}; 16j6n
5. A secure dynamic conference system
To show the usefulness of group authentication systems we will use DMRA-codes to
construct a secure dynamic conference system. By ‘dynamic’ we mean that conferences
are not predetermined and a conference can be held among any c members of the
group. By ‘secure’ we mean (1) a member of the conference can send a message to
all other conference members such that collusion of up to w users, not in the conference,
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cannot learn anything about the message, and (2) collusion of up to w members of
the conference (insiders) cannot substitute a broadcasted message with a fraudulent
one. We note that constructing a dynamic conference scheme that guarantees privacy
of communication among conferences immediately follows from the construction of a
key-distribution scheme for a dynamic conference. A key-distribution scheme provides
a shared key among all conferences which can be used to encrypt messages. However
an encrypted message can be easily substituted by a malicious user of the conference
as the key information is shared among members of the conference, and so there is
no assurance about the authenticity of communicated messages. In the following we
give a construction of a secure dynamic conference system that uses a key-distribution
system proposed by Blundo et al. [8] (BDHKVY for short) and ensures secrecy and
authenticity of communication.
Key-distribution systems: A Key-distribution system (KDS) is one of the main prim-
itives for distributing keys in networks [30]. In a KDS, the collection of all subsets
of n users is divided into privileged subsets and forbidden subsets. To each privileged
subset, G, of users a secret key, kG, is attached. kG is computable by each member
of G and collusion of members of a forbidden set F , disjoint from G, cannot learn
anything about kG. A TA generates and distributes secret key information to all users.
If privileged sets are c-subsets of P, and forbidden sets are all w-subsets of P, we use
the notation (c; w) KDS. For example, a (2; w)-KDS is a KDS where there is a key
associated with each pair of users and no key k{i; j} can be computed by collusion of
any w users that is disjoint from {i; j}. A (c; w) KDS is also called a key-distribution
system for dynamic conferences. A naive approach to constructing a (c; w) KDS will
result in prohibitive cost of key generation and distribution. This can be easily seen
by noting that in a simplistic solution each of the ( nw ) subsets of users can be given
a distinct key and so the key storage for each user is exponential in w and is imprac-
tical for large n. BDHKVY proposed a (c; w)-KDS in which the users’ and the TA’s
key storages are of size ( c+w−1c−1 )log q and ( c+wc )log q, respectively. These are the
minimum possible storage requirements [8].
BDHKVY (c; w)-KDS:
Recall that a polynomial
P(x1; : : : ; xc) =
∑
06j1 ;:::;jc6w
aj1 ;:::;jc(x1)
j1 (x2) j2 · · · (xc) jc
where aj1 ; :::; jc ∈GF(q), is said to be symmetric if
P(x1; : : : ; xc) = P(x3(1); : : : ; x3(c))
for any permutation 3 : {1; 2; : : : ; c}→{1; 2; : : : ; c}. BDHKVY scheme consists of the
following phases.
1. The TA randomly chooses a symmetric polynomial P(x1; : : : ; xc) in c variables with
coe5cients in GF(q); q¿n, and of degree at most w.
2. The TA gives the polynomial fi(x2; : : : ; xc)=P(i; x2; : : : ; xc); obtained by evaluating
P(x1; x2; : : : ; xc) at x1 = i; to Pi, for 16i6n.
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3. If users Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc want to set up a common (conference) key then each user Pji
evaluates fji(x2; : : : ; xc) at (x2; : : : ; xc)= (j1; : : : ; ji−1; ji+1; : : : ; jc):
4. The common (conference) key for users Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc is equal to kj1 ; :::; jc =P(j1; : : : ; jc):
When c=2, BDHKVY scheme is the same as Blom’s scheme [7].
5.1. Securing communication in a dynamic conference system
Given a (c; w)-KDS, we can construct a broadcast encryption system in the following
way. Assume that the TA wants to securely send a message s∈GF(q) to a group of
users Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc ; or else one of the users, Pj1 , wants to securely send s to other users
in {Pj2 ; : : : ; Pjc}. The TA or Pj1 may encrypt s as b= s+ kj1 ; :::; jc and broadcast b. Then
any user in {Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc} can decrypt b and obtain s, by using s= b − kj1 ; :::; jc , while
any group of at most w users that are disjoint from {Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc} have no information
about s.
However, the above communication is not authenticated and the origin of a broad-
casted message cannot be determined and hence there is no accountability in the system.
In the following we show how to add authenticity to this system without requiring more
key bits.
1. Key distribution: We start with a BDHKVY (c; w)-KDS, and assume the TA has
randomly chosen a symmetric polynomial P(x1; : : : ; xc) in c variables and of degree
at most w, and has privately transmitted P(i; x2; : : : ; xc) to user Pi. The Feld GF(q)
is chosen such that q¿max{|S|; n+2( nc )+c−2}, where S is the set of source states.
We associate a number Nj1 ; :::; jc to each group of users of size c, {Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc}, such
that n¡Nj1 ; :::; jc62(
n
c ) and if {Pj1 ; : : : ; Pjc} = {Pj′1 ; : : : ; Pj′c} then |Nj1 ; :::; jc −Nj′1 ;:::;j′c |¿2.
The numbers Nj1 ;:::;jc will serve as identity information for conferences and are made
public.
2. Broadcast: Assume that Pj1 wants to encrypt a message s∈ S and broadcast it such
that each user in {Pj2 ; : : : ; Pjc} can decrypt the message and verify its authenticity.
(a) Pj1 constructs two polynomials, of degree at most w,
Fj1 (x2) = fj1 (x2; Nj1 ;:::;jc ; : : : ; Nj1 ;:::;jc + c − 2);
Gj1 (x2) = fj1 (x2; Nj1 ;:::;jc + 1; : : : ; Nj1 ;:::;jt + c − 1):
(b) Pj1 encrypts s with the (conference) key kj1 ; :::; jc and obtains b= s+ kj1 ; :::; jc .
(c) Pj1 computes the polynomial Aj1 (x2)=Fj1 (x2) + bGj1 (x2) of degree at most w,
and broadcasts (j1; b; Aj1 (x2)).
3. Decryption and verication: A user Pji in {Pj2 ; : : : ; Pjc} can decrypt and verify
the authenticity of a message broadcasted by Pj1 . First, Pji calculates polynomial
Aji(x2)=Fji(x2)+bGji(x2) then he veriFes if Aji(j1)=Aj1 (ji) holds and if true, ac-
cepts the broadcasted codeword as authentic and sent from Pj1 . Finally Pji decrypts
b by s= b− kj1 ; :::; jc to get s.
Theorem 5.1. For c¿2; the above construction provides privacy and authenticity of
communication.
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Proof. From [8], we know that the scheme is a (c; w)-KDS. We need to show that
it also provides the authenticity for the broadcasted message. It is easy to see that
P(x1; x2; Nj1 ; :::; jc ; : : : ; Nj1 ; :::; jc + c − 2) and P(x1; x2; Nj1 ; :::; jc + 1; : : : ; Nj1 ; :::; jc + c − 1), are
symmetric polynomial in two variables of degree at most w. Because of the prop-
erties of BDHKVY scheme [8], any colluding set of up to w users in {P1; : : : ; Pn}
which is disjoint form {Pj1 ; Pji} has no information about kj1 ; ji ; Nj1 ; :::; jc ;:::;Nj1 ; :::; jc+c−2 and
kj1 ; ji ; Nj1 ; :::; jc+1;:::;Nj1 ; :::; jc+c−1. This is the key information used for authentication between
Pj1 and Pji . Using the optimal DMRA-code described in Section 3, we know that the
messages are authenticated.
We note the following.
1. If |S|¿(n+ 2(nc)+ c− 2), the key storage of the above scheme is the same as the
broadcast encryption scheme based on the BDHKVY KDS.
2. In the above construction we assumed the message was broadcasted from one of the
users in a privileged group. We can slightly modify the construction to allow the
encrypted message to be broadcasted by the TA. This can be achieved by including
a dummy user for the TA and constructing a (c + 1; w)-KDS. The rest of the
construction will be similar to above.
3. We have assumed the same level of protection for secrecy and authenticity. In
general we can have w1 as the biggest size of colluding outsiders (not members of
the conference) and w2 (6w1) as the biggest size of colluding insiders.
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied broadcast authentication systems. We argued that DMRA-
codes are the basic primitive for providing authentication in groups and gave two
constructions, an optimal one and a second one with 0exibility that is required for
practical applications. Although both constructions assume only one message sent by
a sender, but it is not di5cult to extend them to multiple messages from the same
sender. When multiple messages are from di7erent senders, a new type of attack must
be considered. The aim of the attack is to tamper with the original information of a
broadcasted message. Protection against this kind of attack implies that each user must
have individual key information and so key-distribution systems that establish a shared
key among users cannot be directly used for group authentication systems.
6.1. Computationally secure tDMRA-codes
The computational model used for assessing security of tDMRA-codes in this pa-
per has been unconditional. Although unconditionally secure schemes o7er the highest
possible security level but their key requirements are usually large and so are of lit-
tle practical application. In practice, data integrity is obtained by using MACs and
signature schemes, corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric key systems. The two
approaches both provide computational security but have di7erent and complementary
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applications. The main di7erences between the two are with regard to the key require-
ments and computational speed. MACs require shared keys and can be made very
fast while digital signatures are asymmetric primitives and are computationally expen-
sive. MACs can be seen as the computationally secure version of A-codes. Numerous
constructions for MACs exist. MACs can be constructed from block cipher systems
(for example, DES) in CBC mode, or using cryptographic hash functions like MD5
and SHA-1. MACs with provable security can be obtained through Wegman–Carter
construction [32] and its extensions [3].
A very important aspect of ‘synthesis’ constructions for MRA, DMRA and tDMRA-
code is that they can be employed with MACs instead of A-codes. Each ‘synthesis’
construction essentially combines an A-code with a combinatorial structure: a cover-
free family, a KDP or a PHF. By replacing the A-code with a MAC, a system (MRA,
DMRA and tDMRA-code) with computational security is obtained such that the se-
curity can be directly related to the security of the underlying MAC and parameters
of the combinatorial structure. A complete security evaluation of the resulting system
requires careful modeling of possible attacks and a formal deFnition of security and
so is beyond the scope of this paper.
Using universality of ‘synthesis’ constructions makes it also possible to construct
e5cient systems for large groups through recursive constructions using PHFs.
6.2. Open problems
The question of optimality of tDMRA-code is only answered when t=1. Deriving
information theoretic and combinatorial bounds for general tDMRA-codes, and con-
structing optimal tDMRA- systems are interesting open problems.
We noted that ‘synthesis’ construction can be used for computational model of se-
curity. Formal deFnition of security in this model and proving security of these con-
structions with respect to the model will be important extension of this work.
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